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The unquestionable center of gravity of a patent infringement suit is the meaning 
of selected words in the patent claim. The process that a court applies to decide the 
meaning of disputed language; whether it ought to consider evidence outside the patent 
record; and if it does, whether factual findings made from that evidence are entitled to 
deference on appeal are the three tightly reticulated questions that comprise the claim 
construction debate. They are also the most frequently debated and most pressing 
questions in patent law. This Article is directed to a single model to resolve the debate 
over these three chronic problems. 
I. An Informal Taxonomy of Claim Construction Disputes 
The interpretive model presented in this article is premised upon empirical 
observation, i.e., by observing how claim construction is actually performed by the 
Federal Circuit. This examination reveals that claim construction proceeds through 
selection by the trial judge or Federal Circuit panel using one of two constructions 
presented by the parties: one proffered by the patent owner and one by the accused 
infringer. In other words, claim construction--judicial rhetoric notwithstanding--is not an 
unconstrained search of the disputed term’s meaning, but instead a more ordinary process 
of selection from among two alternatives. This selection is made between two proffered 
interpretations for the disputed claim language. The author suggests that one way to 
understand claim construction is to understand precisely how these two proffered 
interpretations compare to one another, and how the interpretations compare to a single 
agreed-upon benchmark (the term’s fixed meaning). 
Empirical observation aside (i.e. what courts actually do), this process of 
construction is the most sensible. The essential question under which all others are 
subsumed is whether the accused device lays within the scope of the patent owner’s 
property right. For the purposes of analysis, this question is ordinarily divisible into *192 
two smaller questions: (1) what is the scope of the property right?; and (2) does the 
accused device lay within it? The scope of the property right is determined from the 
patent’s claims, which are mainly expressed in words and their meanings. Empirically 
speaking, only a few words, sometimes just one, are in dispute. Therefore, determining 
the scope of the property right--the first step in the infringement question--is actually a 
                                                        
* Division Patent Counsel, Schlumberger Technology Corporation, Dowell 
Division, Sugar Land, Texas, ybarbo@sugar-land.dowell.slb.com. I am grateful for the 
excellent assistance of Amy Werner. 
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matter of interpreting a few words (i.e. the disputed claim terms). The trial court 
identifies the disputed claim term or terms, then requires the two parties to offer their 
respective constructions of that term. Naturally, the accused infringer will urge a 
construction of the disputed term that places the accused device outside the just-
determined scope, and not surprisingly this proffered construction is as broad as possible 
yet just barely avoids the accused device. Of course, the patent owner will urge a 
construction that places the accused device within the scope. Yet while the patent owner 
wishes to urge a construction that captures the accused device, he is careful not to offer a 
proposed construction that is so broad that the recently construed claims are judged 
invalid.1 Hence, the process of proffering an interpretation of the disputed claim’s term 
has a strong self-policing character to it. The trial court decides infringement by 
construing the patent claims. The court can certainly refuse to select one of the two 
proffered constructions and create its own, but there is no point in doing so because 
whatever that construction is, it will either capture the accused device or release it. 
At the end of the day, the accused device either infringes or it does not. The trial 
court’s only task is to answer that binary question; it cannot, regardless of what it does, 
supplement that result. There is no point in seeking a finer distinction that the end result 
permits. Therefore, claim construction should not be an unbounded search for the 
disputed term’s meaning but instead a rational process of selection from between the two 
proffered alternatives. 
What follows is a discussion of three distinct lines of cases. Each line of authority 
has emerged in response to the directives of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., and 
each is by now securely installed in the Federal Circuit’s claim construction 
jurisprudence.2 As we shall see, step-wise application of the principle embodied in each 
line actually defines post-Markman claim construction. 
*193 II. The Markman Model 
A. What is Claim Construction? 
In Modine Mfg. v. United States International Trade Commission, a case decided 
shortly after Markman, the disputed claim term was “flat side walls” in a patent directed 
to a refrigerant condenser used in automotive air conditioners.3 Because the accused 
device had fin-like projections on the interior walls of its condensor (to increase the 
                                                        
1 Claims are held invalid for numerous reasons. The particular reasons with which 
we are concerned with in this case are when the claims read on prior art or when the 
claims are not enabled by the specification. 
2 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (1995). 
3 Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550, 37 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1611 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
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surface area, thus providing additional condensation), the accused infringer argued that 
“flat side walls” meant that the interior walls of the condenser are smooth or without fins 
or webbing.4 The patent owner, Modine, argued that the “flat side walls” referred to the 
cross-sectional exterior shape of the condenser tubes; thus, it meant that the tubes in 
cross-section are not circular but oval.5 
The disputed claim language appears this way in the claim: “[w]eb means within 
said flat cross-section tubes and extending between and joined to the flat side walls ....”6 
The claim not only allows interior web fin-like projections but it requires them. 
According to the accused infringer, “flat” means without web means; but “web means” 
and “flat” are both required elements of the claimed condenser.7 If the accused infringer 
were correct that “flat side walls” meant that the interior walls were without web means, 
then the claim is internally inconsistent. Because a patented device cannot both have an 
element and not have it at the same time, the accused infringer’s proffered construction 
produced a linguistically implausible reading of the claims. Therefore, construction of the 
disputed claim term was resolved entirely by eliminating one of the two proffered 
constructions by identifying the one that produced an implausible reading of the text. In 
other words, the dispute in Modine was soluble solely from the claims themselves 
without the need for extrinsic evidence. 
*194 Now compare Modine with Markman. The patent in Markman was directed 
to a system for tracking various items in a retail dry cleaning operation to prevent loss 
and theft.8 The disputed claim term was “inventory.”9 The patent owner, Markman, 
argued that it could refer to either cash or clothes, as well as cash and clothes together.10 
The trial court quickly discarded this construction since it rendered the claim limitation 
internally incoherent: “[w]hereby said system can detect and localize spurious additions 
to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom.”11 The trial court reasoned that if the 
term “inventory” could refer to cash only, then this limitation rendered the entire claim 
incoherent.12 The reason is that cash is not “localized” since it does not travel through the 
                                                        
4 Id. at 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611. 
5 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611. 
6 Id. at 1549, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611 (emphasis added). 
7 Id. at 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611-12. 
8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1995). 
9 Id. at 974, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325. 
10 Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325. 
11 Id. at 982, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331. 
 
Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191 
 
dry cleaning system.13 Also, cash is not reasonably subject to “spurious additions” to the 
system.14 The Court concluded that the term “inventory” cannot mean just “cash.”15 
In Markman, just like in Modine, the claim construction dispute was resolved not 
by a quixotic search for the term’s true meaning, but instead by a pragmatic yet 
systematic process of eliminating the linguistically implausible interpretation from 
among the two proffered constructions. Not once did the Federal Circuit in Markman or 
Modine even hint at what was the “true meaning” of the term “flat side walls” or 
“inventory.” Again, the accused infringer argued that “inventory” must refer to at least 
clothes (e.g., either clothes or clothes and cash).16 The patent owner argued that it could 
refer to just cash.17 The Markman Court resolved the dispute not by asking what the term 
actually meant, but instead by checking each of the two proffered conjectures against the 
text and eliminating the one that fails to preserve the text’s internal coherence. Thus the 
Markman Court *195 never once actually said what “inventory” meant, though it did say, 
that whatever it meant, it could not refer to just cash.18 
First, notice that the Markman and Modine panels did not assign meaning to the 
disputed claim language. Instead each produced its construction by selecting one from 
among the two constructions proffered by the parties, and more particularly, by 
eliminating the least plausible one. Indeed, almost without exception, the Federal Circuit 
performs the process of claim construction not by creating or determining the meaning of 
the claims. Instead what the Court does, if one looks closely enough, is select one of the 
two constructions proffered by the parties; often by eliminating the least plausible 
                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331. 
13 Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331. 
14 Markman, 52 F.3d at 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331. 
15 Id. at 988-89, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337. 
16 Id. at 974, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325. 
17 Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1325. 
18 Sometimes Federal Circuit opinions recite the “meaning” of the claim in these 
terms (i.e., by what the scope does not include). For example, “[t]he word ‘passage’ in 
the asserted claims, properly construed, does not encompass a completely cylindrical, 
smooth-walled structure.” O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co. Inc., 115 F.3d 1576, 1581, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1777, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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alternative.1920 This is an empirically demonstrable proposition. The Federal Circuit or its 
predecessor court has rejected both parties’ proffered constructions and decreed its own 
claim construction a grand total of three times in the past twenty years.21 The majority 
opinion in each case was authored by the same judge, Judge Clevenger. Moreover, two of 
these cases in particular, Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corporation and J.T. 
Eaton v. Atlantic Paste Glue Company, were harshly criticized, both by the dissenting 
judges and by the patent *196 bar.22 Both cases were criticized not only for de novo 
construction but also for the particular construction the court chose.23 
 
                                                        
19 That is why one often sees Federal Circuit judges state in dictum that claim 
construction is generally dispositive of the infringement analysis. Of course it’s 
dispositive. The patent owner proffers a construction of the disputed claim term that, if 
selected, would place the accused device within the claim scope; and the accused 
infringer proffers a construction that, if selected, would place the accused device outside 
the claim scope. 
20 Also, claim construction is really not a process of determining the scope of the 
claims. Instead, it is a matter of interpreting one or more (often just one) disputed words 
or terms within the claim: As with many patent cases, at issue is the meaning of only a 
few words in the claims--sometimes just a single word, rarely more than three or four.” 
See, e.g., Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1418 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
21 See, J.T. Eaton v. Atlantic Paste Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996); and Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 
64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995). These are all Clevenger opinions. 
Thus, while Judge Clevenger has failed to grasp the Federal Circuit’s established practice 
of claim construction, consider how he tentatively followed the Markman approach (only 
to ignore it later): “Therefore, in our view, the plain meaning of the claim will not bear a 
reading that ‘pusher assembly’ and ‘pusher bar’ are synonymous.” Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 
1579, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024. He should have stopped right there but he didn’t. In the 
very next sentence he said this: “The question remains, though, what is the meaning of 
the term ‘pusher assembly’?” Id. 
22 See, e.g., Kelly Ann Casey, Recent Developments: Exxon Chemical Patents v. 
Lubrizol Corp.: The Federal Circuit Sets Unreasonable Standards for Chemical 
Composition Inventions, 31 GA. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1997); A Statutory Solution to the 
Mischiefs of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 279, 308 
(1997). 
23 Casey, Recent Developments, 31 GA. L. REV. at 1228; Note, A Statutory 
Solution, 63 Brooklyn L. Rev. at 308. 
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Second, Markman’s core proposition is that “[a] term can be defined only in a 
way that comports with the instrument as a whole”.24 The opinion reiterated more 
precisely that it required that the proposed definition fully complies with the specification 
and claims and so will preserve the patent’s internal coherence. This is a sophisticated 
interpretive model and a challenging directive to execute. But how can we tell whether a 
particular construction of a disputed claim term preserves the patent’s internal coherence? 
In fact, it’s difficult to do since it requires reading the entire text and having a thorough 
understanding of the complex relationship between the invention’s primary elements. 
However, what is much easier is to tell is whether a particular construction does not 
preserve the text’s internal coherence.25 Thus, if one conjecture is checked against the 
text and it renders two portions of the text incoherent or in conflict with one another, then 
this conjecture must be discarded. Hence, “internal textual coherence” is a reasonably 
objective baseline indeed as evidenced by Modine and Markman. As we shall see, the 
Federal Circuit has relied upon this baseline to decide a number of post-Markman 
disputes, and from these decisions a rule has coalesced. 
Markman and Modine stand for the proposition that claim construction is not a 
process of assigning meaning to each of the terms in a claim, rather it is a process of 
systematically eliminating implausible interpretations (i.e. textual not technical 
implausibility). The linguistic competence needed to do this is not high. For instance, 
consider the statements “all cocker spaniels are dogs,” “Cujo is not a dog,” and “Cujo is a 
cocker spaniel.” If one can tell that if the first two statements are correct then the third is 
not. Thus, the third statement renders the “text” (the sum of the three statements) 
incoherent. Notice that one can make this claim about the implausibility of statement 
number three, even if they have never seen a cocker spaniel nor ever met Cujo. Similarly, 
one could confirm that the accused infringer’s proffered construction in Modine was 
implausible without any knowledge of condenser technology. 
*197 B. Other Cases That Apply the Markman Model 
Vitronics Corporation v. Conceptronics, Inc. is a virtually identical dispute.26 
Despite almost unanimous criticism from the patent bar, this case is correctly decided 
beyond a shadow of a doubt. In Vitronics, the disputed claim term was “solder reflow 
temperature.”27 Unfortunately, this term was not used anywhere in the specification.28 
                                                        
24 Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1391, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470 (citations omitted). 
25 Id., 38 U.S.P.Q. at 1470. 
26 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
27 Id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
28 Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
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The first time it appears is in the claims.29 Two other terms were in fact mentioned in the 
specification: “liquidus temperature” and “peak reflow temperature.”30 So the question 
was which of these two terms was synonymous with the disputed claim term. The 
plaintiff, Vitronics, argued that the disputed claim term, “solder reflow temperature,” 
referred to “peak reflow temperature.”31 The accused infringer, Conceptronics, argued 
that the disputed claim term referred to “liquidus temperature.”32 
Two different temperatures are relevant in soldering technology as it relates to the 
Vitronics patent.33 The first is the temperature at which the solder first begins to melt and 
freely flow (the liquidus temperature).34 The second important temperature is the one in 
which the solder re-flows after first melting, obviously a higher temperature than the first 
(the peak reflow temperature).35 In the Vitronics specification, three exemplary types of 
solder are described each having a liquidus *198 temperature of 190° C and a peak 
reflow temperature of about 210-218° C.36 With that background in mind, here is that 
crucial claim language: “A method for reflow soldering ... for a period of time sufficient 
to cause said solder to reflow and solder said devices to said board while maintaining the 
temperature of said device below said solder reflow temperature.”37 Thus, Claim 1 recites 
a process of soldering “[w]hile maintaining the temperature below said solder reflow 
temperature.”38 Again, whether the claim term “solder reflow temperature” refers to 
                                                        
29 Generally, the Federal Circuit decisions and the scholarly commentary use the 
term “specification” to refer to the entire patent document minus the claims. Thus, in 
common vernacular, the patent document consists of the specification and the claims. In 
fact, the claims are part of the specification according to the Patent Code (35 U.S.C. § 
112 ¶ 1 (1988)). I shall use the terms “specification” and “claims” consistent with their 
common usage, rather than in the formal sense. 
30 Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
31 Id. 
32 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
33 Id. at 1579-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
34 Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
35 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1579-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1573, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
36 Id. at 1580 n.3, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574 n.3. 
37 Id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
38 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
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“liquidus temperature” or to “peak reflow temperature” is the issue on appeal.39 
If the disputed claim term refers to “liquidus temperature” (as defined in the 
specification) then the claim language just recited makes no sense. One cannot solder 
below the liquidus temperature; by definition, that is the temperature at which the solder 
first begins to melt.40 Thus, below the liquidus temperature soldering cannot occur. On 
the other hand, if the disputed claim term referred to the peak reflow temperature then 
this portion of the claim is at least sensible or not internally incoherent. So Vitronics, just 
like Markman and Modine, is an extraordinarily easy dispute to resolve, one of the two 
proffered constructions renders the claim incoherent and therefore must be rejected.41 
Also just like Markman, the Vitronics Court never bothered to find the correct meaning 
of the disputed claim term. Instead, all it did was determine that it could not mean 
“liquidus temperature,” but that it could plausibly refer to “peak reflow temperature.” 
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit vacated the trial court’s construction of the 
claims,42 and in both Markman and Vitronics, the trial courts relied upon extrinsic 
evidence. Yet on appeal, the Federal Circuit did not look at the extrinsic evidence, but 
instead produced its construction based solely upon the intrinsic record. More to the 
point: the case did not involve a re-reading of the extrinsic record. Therefore, according 
to the Vitronics court, deference is not owed to those factual findings because any factual 
findings produced were illegitimate (i.e., they were not *199 necessary to resolve the 
dispute, as evidenced by the fact that the panels did not consider them in reaching a 
contrary construction). So one must not confuse cases of this sort with those like Bausch 
& Lomb Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve Inc..43 There the Federal Circuit (pre-
Markman), like Vitronics, set aside the trial court’s claim construction and developed its 
own, but unlike Vitronics, based its construction, at least in part, upon the re-reading of 
the extrinsic record. 
C. A Brief Digression: The Proper Standard of Review 
 
                                                        
39 Id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1575. 
40 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1574. 
41 And yet despite this simplicity, Vitronics was decided after a lengthy trial 
followed by an appeal. This case should illustrate, as well as any, that nearly any dispute 
no matter how simple, can be made much more complex once extrinsic evidence--
particularly expert testimony--is admitted. 
42 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1586, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
43 Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230 
U.S.P.Q. 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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If this view is correct, then it offers a solution to the debate over the proper 
standard of review in claim construction disputes. The Markman and Cybor Corporation 
v. FAS Technologies, Inc. courts--both en banc decisions--have decreed that the standard 
of review is de novo. Yet the debate over the deference owed to factual findings made at 
the trial level continues as evidenced by cases like Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, 
Inc. and Eastman Kodak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, and even more recently, 
two post-Cybor cases, Voice Technologies and Key Pharmaceuticals.44 
In fact, many standards of review in U.S. law, including patent law, are de novo.45 
Yet underlying facts are still assessed under a more discretionary standard; hence most de 
novo standards are actually a hybrid or layered standard.46 Markman *200 and Vitronics 
are perfectly consistent with this background rule. In these two cases, the extrinsic 
evidence was not reviewed under any standard, since the Federal Circuit made an a priori 
determination that the lower court should not have relied upon extrinsic evidence at all. If 
it had decided that extrinsic evidence was properly received during trial, then deference is 
owed to those factual findings.47 This plenary authority to assign the dispute to one 
category or another (i.e., to determine whether extrinsic evidence is necessary or not) 
defines de novo review in claim construction disputes. This view accounts for the desire 
to defer to trial courts on factual findings, which are beyond question the more 
experienced and structurally far better situated forum to conduct factual inquiries, while 
at the same time ensuring that trial courts do not slowly but insidiously short circuit 
appellate review by re-labeling then subsuming the entire dispute under the rubric of 
“factual determinations.” 
 
                                                        
44 Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Eastman Kodak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Voice Technologies Group, Inc. v. VC Systems, Inc., 
164 F.3d 605, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon 
Laboratories, Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
45 For instance, the obviousness determination under section 103 of the Patent 
Code”[i]s a question of law that this court reviews de novo ....” In re Donaldson 
Company, Inc. 16 F.3d 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), as is the 
enablement standard under § 112, ¶ 1 “Although the question of whether [a party’s 
foreign priority] specification contains a sufficient disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 
is one of law, ... compliance with the written description aspect of that requirement is a 
question of fact.” Utter v. Hiranga, 845 F.2d 993, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
46 See, Fromson, 132 F.3d 1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Eastman 
Kodak, 114 F.3d 1547, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Voice Technologies Group, 
Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Key Pharmaceuticals, 161 F.3d 
709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
47 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 114 F.3d at 1555, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1742. 
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D. Still More Cases That Apply the Markman Model 
Permitting extrinsic evidence into the claim construction inquiry dilutes the 
record, which inevitably enlarges the error rate. Vitronics is a perfect example. The trial 
court allowed and relied upon extrinsic evidence. The Federal Circuit reached a contrary 
claim construction by relying solely on the intrinsic evidence. As evidenced by this 
discussion, Vitronics was an unusually easy case--one of the two proffered constructions 
produced an implausible or contradictory reading of the patent and was therefore quickly 
eliminated by a straightforward reading of the patent. That is the impression one gets 
from reading the Federal Circuit’s opinion, yet the case also demonstrates that easy cases 
become difficult when an ocean of extrinsic evidence obscures the debate. Vitronics 
stands squarely for the proposition that no amount of technical detail will transform a 
linguistically implausible interpretation into a plausible one, but what it may do is coax 
the trial court in the face of a heap of extrinsic evidence in predictable equipoise (to 
overlook an easy solution). 
Next, consider Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., which is another post-Markman case.48 
Maxwell involved a device for securing together a single pair of shoes.49 Retail stores 
prefer that each pair of shoes be kept together.50 If they become *201 separated, then they 
may become undesirable if the customer can’t locate the other member of the pair. For 
shoes with laces, this isn’t a problem because a plastic thread can be run through one 
eyelet of each shoe and then the two ends of the thread connected.51 For shoes without 
eyelets for laces (e.g., woman’s high-heeled pumps), this technique is not operable.52 
Consequently, the inventors of the patent-in-suit developed a tab which is placed along 
the inside of each shoe, which roughly function like ordinary eyelets in shoes having 
laces.53 At the end of each tab is a small eyelet through which a plastic thread can be run, 
hence connecting the two shoes.54 
The accused tab was actually a part of the shoe’s lining, so the defendant argued 
that the claim term “fastening tab” must be separate from the shoe’s lining.55 By contrast, 
                                                        
48 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
49 Id. at 1101, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
50 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
51 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
52 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
53 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
54 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1002. 
55 Id. at 1105, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005. 
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the patent owner argued that the tab could be a part of the shoe’s lining.56 Consider the 
relevant claim language: “[t]ab ... extending vertically upward ... but spaced apart from 
the inside surface of the shoe upper.”57 The disputed claim term “shoe upper” 
indisputably includes the inner lining; therefore, the claim itself forecloses the plaintiff’s 
proffered construction (i.e., the plaintiff argued that the fastening tab can be a part of the 
shoe’s lining). Specifically, the claim requires that the tab be spaced apart from the 
lining.58 Hence, if it is part of the shoe’s lining, then the portion of the claim just recited 
makes no sense; i.e., a tab cannot be both part of the shoe lining and spaced apart from it. 
Once again, like Markman, Vitronics, and Modine, Maxwell is soluble solely by a 
careful inspection of the claim itself. Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by the 
simplicity of these disputes. This is particularly obvious once the focus is redirected 
towards the intrinsic record. No doubt such disputes can be made complicated if the 
dispute is poorly framed (the disputed claim term is not precisely identified, or the two 
proffered constructions are not established), or if the trial court yields to the unfortunate 
temptation to open the floodgates and let in the inevitable avalanche of extrinsic evidence 
once either party urges some tiny sliver of ambiguity  *202 (which is what happened in 
Vitronics for instance). The need to avoid complicating what are genuinely simple 
disputes, therefore, is perhaps responsible more than anything else for the Federal 
Circuit’s militant proscription on extrinsic evidence expressed in Vitronics, and slightly 
less so in Markman. Indeed, this proscription is well grounded provided that the claim 
construction dispute fits the model just described that is where one of the two proffered 
constructions is eliminated on the ground that it renders the text internally incoherent. 
In Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., the patent at issue was related to a particular type 
of semiconductor device known as a MOSFET (Metal Oxide Semiconductor Field Effect 
Transistor), which is used to control the flow of electrical power.59 A thyristor is a similar 
device, but it exhibits “latching,” which refers to the fact that the thyristor will turn on 
and remain on even after a gate control signal is removed.60 This latching property arises 
from the structure of the thyristor.61 The four alternating semiconductor regions 
incorporate two three-layer combinations, each of which has a forward current gain 
denoted as α1 and α2.62 According to the standard teaching in the semiconductor art, a 
                                                        
56 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005. 
57 Id. at 1102, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003. 
58 Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003. 
59 Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 1149, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
60 Id. at 1151, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019. 
61 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019. 
62 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
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thyristor will not latch if the sum of α1 and α2 is less than one.63 
The claim at issue was directed to a MOSFET device; the disputed language was: 
“no thyristor action occurs under any device operating conditions.”64 IXYS, the accused 
infringer, argued that the disputed language referred only to four-layer devices that, 
because of their structure, never acted as thyristors (i.e., in other words, α1 + α2 is always 
less than one).65 The patent owner, Harris, predictably argued for a broader construction: 
that the MOSFET device can act as a thyristor under certain conditions as long as the 
device was intended to be operated below the thyristor threshold.66 Thus, according to the 
accused infringer the claim excludes thyristors, and according to the patent owner the 
claim can include them. 
*203 The Federal Circuit rejected Harris’s broad interpretation and selected the 
one urged by IXYS.67 Despite the obvious complexity of the technology, the Court 
produced its construction without extrinsic evidence. Indeed, like Modine and the other 
cases discussed in this section, the Court reached its construction by eliminating one of 
the two proffered constructions; the Court’s reasoning was linguistic rather than 
technical. In this instance, the Court observed that Harris’s proffered construction was 
difficult to reconcile with the claim language “under any device operating conditions,” 
since Harris urged that an accused device could infringe if it exhibited thyristor behavior 
under some operating conditions.68 In straightforward terms, the Court eliminated 
Harris’s argument once it identified an obvious linguistic inconsistency: In plain terms, 
Harris’s claim construction argument is that the intended “operating conditions” of the 
patented device do not include conditions that cause the device to latch, and therefore the 
device does not latch under its intended “operating conditions.”69 
In summary, the Federal Circuit resolved a claim construction dispute relating to 
particularly complex technology without a single glance at extrinsic evidence based 
solely on identifying each party’s proffered construction, and then eliminating the one 
that produced an incoherent reading of the patent. 
                                                        
63 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
64 Id., 114 F.3d at 1152, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
65 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
66 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
67 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020. 
68 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021. 
69 Id., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1021. 
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Finally, consider PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp.70 In this case the 
disputed claim term was “SO3.”71 The plaintiff argued that it referred to all sulfur 
compounds including iron sulfide.72 The defendant argued that the term referred only to 
dissolved sulfate retained in the glass composition.73 The term was not defined in the 
specification.74 From a distance, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which extrinsic 
evidence is less objectionable. Expert testimony seems absolutely crucial to explain how 
one skilled in the relevant art would understand the disputed term; indeed, both 
candidates seem plausible. In fact, the trial court permitted PPG to introduce expert 
testimony on this issue.75 What is interesting *204 though is that the Federal Circuit did 
not rely upon extrinsic evidence. Instead, it held based solely on a careful examination of 
the specification that the term SO3 must refer only to dissolved sulfates.76 The court 
observed that the specification states that “[r]esidual amounts [of SO3] in the glass can 
vary and have no significant effect on the properties of the glass product.”77 Yet as both 
parties agreed, iron sulfide is a strong colorant in glass; in other words, it can have a 
“significant effect” on glass properties.78 Therefore, “SO3,” whatever it means, cannot 
include iron sulfide, since the statement in the specification states that SO3 in small 
amounts has no significant effect on glass properties. Following this analysis, the term 
“SO3,” if it were to mean all sulfur species including iron sulfide, would render the 
specification contradictory since it would refer to SO3 in two different ways (i.e., SO3 
cannot both have no significant effect and have a significant effect).79 Therefore, this 
construction must be eliminated.80 Also observe that the Federal Circuit never actually 
defined the term “SO3” but just decreed that, whatever it meant, it could not refer to all 
sulfide species; the plaintiff’s proffered construction was eliminated, therefore resolving 
                                                        
70 PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
71 Id. at 1356, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
72 Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
73 Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
74 Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
75 Id. at 1357, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356. 
76 Id. at 1356, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1357. 
77 Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
78 Id., 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355. 
79 Id. at 1357, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1356-57. 
80 Id. at 1358, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1357. 
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the claim construction issue.81 
Remember that claim construction is just a predicate to the ultimate question of 
infringement, which is a binary decision; either the accused device infringes or it does 
not. The patent owner will urge a construction that will capture the accused device within 
the scope of the claims, and of course the accused infringer will offer one that excludes it. 
The trial judge correctly performs the claim construction task by selecting one of these. 
There is little point in doing more than this; principled construction of a legal document 
should mean not seeking more precision or generality than you need for the particular 
task at hand. The cases discussed in this section reflect that each case is remarkable in its 
emphasis on identifying the implausible interpretation, rather than on comparing the two 
to determine the best one, or worse, embarking on an unbounded search for the singular, 
correct meaning. For example: 
*205 [Maxwell] [T]o accept Maxwell’s claim interpretation that the inside 
lining of the shoe is part of the tab, we would have to ignore the claim 
limitations that require ....82 
[Markman] [T]he claim phrase “detect and localize spurious additions to 
inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom” does not make sense 
using Markman’s definition of “inventory.”83 
[PPG Industries] [A]n interpretation that includes all sulfur compounds 
would call into question the accuracy of the statement in the specification 
....84 
Additionally, if the Federal Circuit wanted its judges to ransack the record in 
some sort of cryptographic quest for the singular correct meaning, then it would not have 
placed such tight restrictions on the use of extrinsic evidence, as indeed it did in 
Markman and Cybor.85 In fact, if one is trying to crack a code, then all interpretive 
                                                        
81 In PPG, the Federal Circuit never admonished the trial court for relying on 
extrinsic evidence, probably because the trial court got the right answer, like Markman 
but unlike Vitronics; nevertheless, it is very clear that the Federal Circuit did not rely 
upon that extrinsic evidence in PPG. 
82 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996). 
83 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 116 S. Ct. 1384, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461(1995). 
84 PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1356, 48 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
85 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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sources should be freely available without restriction, which in this case, they are not. 
Therefore, what the cases presented in this section (collected in Table A) demonstrate is 
that a routine and indeed preferred technique of claim construction is to check each 
proffered construction against the text and eliminate one of the two proffered 
constructions that renders the patent internally incoherent. This technique is now firmly 
installed in the Federal Circuit claim construction jurisprudence. 
Finally, it should come as no surprise that the Federal Circuit’s harsh 
proscriptions on extrinsic evidence are found in the cases discussed in this section cases 
in which the claim construction dispute is easiest to resolve. More to the point, the 
authors of Markman, Vitronics, and most recently, Cybor, appear to *206 believe that 
disputes requiring extrinsic evidence occur far too infrequently, if ever, to justify an 
exception to claim construction jurisprudence. For instance: 
[W]hile credibility determinations theoretically could play a role in claim 
construction, the chance of such an occurrence is “doubtful” ....86 
[T]he specification is ... usually dispositive ... it is the single best guide to 
the meaning of a disputed term.87 
In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity 
in a disputed claim term.8889 
In this next section, a second category of cases shall be examined. These cases 
involve situations where both proffered constructions produce a plausible reading of the 
text and are not soluble using the Markman model. One purpose of this examination is to 
assess whether the Federal Circuit’s proscriptions on extrinsic evidence are justified. 
III. The Multiform model 
 
                                                        
86 Id. at 1455-56, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1174 (citing Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1395, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1469). 
87 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
88 Id. at 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1577. 
89 Vary or contradict with respect to what? Taken literally, this seems to mean that 
extrinsic evidence can only be relied upon to corroborate or to provide meaning when the 
intrinsic record is silent or too self-conflicting to reliably converge on a single meaning 
(i.e., the intrinsic record, at different parts, supports both proffered constructions). In 
other words, Markman and progeny appear to prohibit extrinsic evidence in those 
instances in which it would actually be probative. 
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Aside from the Markman family, a second distinct and distinguishable line of 
cases has coalesced into at least a tendency and at most a legal standard. Exemplary cases 
from this line shall be discussed in detail. Readers can then determine for themselves 
whether these cases suggest a discernible pattern, and whether this pattern implies a legal 
rule. In this Article, the interpretive strategy *207 applied in this particular family of 
Federal Circuit decisions shall be referred to as the “Multiform model.” The cases 
discussed in this section are listed in Table B. 
The characteristics that define the Multiform model cases exhibit the following 
pattern. First, the patent owner urges the dictionary definition (either layman’s or 
technical) of the disputed claim term; the accused infringer proffers a narrower 
construction, but one subsumed within the dictionary definition. Second, the Court 
refuses the ordinary dictionary definition of the term, even though the term is not 
expressly defined in the specification, and ultimately selects the narrower of the two 
proffered constructions.90 Third, although both proffered constructions produce a 
coherent and plausible reading of the patent--they are not soluble by applying the 
Markman model--the Federal Circuit nonetheless resolves the dispute without extrinsic 
evidence. In each case comprising this family, the Federal Circuit deliberately avoids 
extrinsic evidence even though it is available, is probative, and was relied upon by the 
trial court.91 Finally, in each instance, the Court selects the proffered construction in 
accordance with the stated objectives or purpose of the invention, and it rejects the 
                                                        
90 Indeed, this trend towards narrower constructions from the Federal Circuit has 
been noted by others. See, Patrick J. Flinn and Keith E. Broyles, The Patent Prairie Gets 
Fenced In: The Court’s Trend Seems to Be Towards Limiting Patent Claims, NAT’L L. 
J., C4, Feb. 8, 1999. 
91 One apparent exception is Fromson v. Anitek Printing Plates Inc., 132 F.3d 
1437, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997); however, though extrinsic evidence was 
admitted and perhaps relied upon at trial, the Federal Circuit mentioned it only to 
corroborate its construction produced solely from the intrinsic record as evidenced by this 
remark from the Cybor majority: “In Fromson, the district court ‘relied primarily on the 
‘754 specification ....’ [citing, Fromson, 132 F.3d at 1442, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269] Although 
the extrinsic record--expert testimony, prior art, and scientific tests--confirmed the district 
court’s claim construction, it was directed primarily to whether Anitec’s thin, nonporous 
oxide layer infringed the claims.” Cybor Corporation v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 
F.3d 1448, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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proffered construction inconsistent with those stated objectives.92 
*208 The first of these cases is Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam LTD.93 In 
Multiform, the disputed claim term was “degrade” in a claim directed to a device for 
controlling spilled liquids.94 The claimed device is a packet that consists of a degradable 
envelope which holds an absorbing material and a treating material.95 This packet can be 
placed near a container filled with a hazardous liquid, so that if the liquid spills, it 
contacts the envelope, and eventually “degrades” it, hence releasing the absorbing and 
treating material, which acts on the spilled liquid.96 In the preferred embodiment of the 
invention, the packet envelope is made of a soluble material, which readily dissolves 
                                                        
92 The Federal Circuit has decided several other cases after Markman in which it 
applied an interpretive strategy very similar to the Multiform model, though the cases did 
not have all of the characteristics that I identified above. See, Bell & Howell Document 
Management Prods. Comp. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033, 1038 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (selecting the broader of the two proffered constructions, though 
essentially applying the Multiform model, “The specification sets forth that the invention 
is an improvement over, inter alia, the paper-ribbed prior art because it does not use a 
separate adhesive layer between the ribs and the panels .... [I]t is the main object of this 
invention to provide ... a jacket for microfilm wherein the channels are defined by in situ 
ribs which are integral with the panels of the jacket ....”); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura 
LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 1160, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577, 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (construing the 
term “greater than 3% elasticity,” which obviously had no dictionary definition; 
moreover, the two proffered constructions were of approximately equal scope, “[O]ur 
interpretation of the claims is consistent with and furthers the purpose of the invention.”); 
Novo Nordisk of North America Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1370, 37 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1773, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (deciding the case based upon the Multiform 
model, though neither party relied upon the ordinary dictionary definition. Quoting the 
applicants’ remarks made during prosecution, the Court stated “the present invention 
provides a basis for dispensing with the necessity of an additional processing step. It, for 
the first time, provides a convenient method for producing in a host system a protein 
which is in mature form, having been expressed directly by means of this invention.”); 
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1228 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (selecting the broader of the two proffered constructions but rejecting 
the narrower dictionary definition, “We too conclude ... that ‘skinless’ is properly 
construed as a performance characteristic ....”). 
93 Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
94 Id. at 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1430. 
95 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
96 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
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upon contact with most liquids.97 The absorbing material is preferably sodium 
polyacrylate, a known absorbent, which expands and forms a gel on contact with a liquid; 
the treating material can be a deodorizer, for instance.98 
Medzam, the accused infringer, sold a similar packet, but the envelope was made 
of a porous material (like the kind used in teabags).99 This causes the Medzam packet to 
work a little differently than Multiform’s preferred embodiment. Hence, when the 
Medzam envelope contacts a spilled liquid, the absorbing material inside the envelope 
expands and bursts the envelope (rather than dissolves as in the Multiform envelope), 
releasing the entire contents for further absorbing and *209 treatment.100 Medzam argued 
that the mode of releasing the envelope contents--i.e., bursting--was excluded from the 
meaning of the claim term “degradable.”101 This term, it argued, referred to dissolution, 
as evidenced by the embodiments recited in Multiform’s specification.102 
Multiform’s rejoinder was very simple. It urged that the ordinary layman’s 
dictionary definition of the term “degradable” must control, absent an express definition 
in the specification to the contrary (there was none).103 Therefore, Medzam argued, the 
term had its ordinary meaning, which was: “[a]ny loss in containment function of the 
envelope.”104 So, Medzam’s proffered construction was not repugnant to Multiform’s, 
indeed, it was a narrower definition, subsumed within it. In addition, both interpretation 
produced a coherent reading of the specification. 
                                                        
97 Id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1432. 
98 Id. at 1475, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
99 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
100 Id. at 1476, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
101 Id. at 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
102 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431. 
103 See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]ords in a claim are generally given their 
ordinary and customary meaning ....”); see also, York Products., Inc. v. Central Tractor 
Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1619, 1622 (Fed.Cir.1996) 
(“Without an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim 
terms take on their ordinary meaning.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 
78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical term used 
in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by 
persons experienced in the field of the invention ....”). 
104 Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, LTD., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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The trial court refused to assign the ordinary dictionary meaning to the disputed 
term, and agreed with Medzam.105 It defined the term “degradable” more narrowly that 
its general dictionary definition, “[i]n light of the mode of action of the accused device 
....”106 The Federal Circuit agreed.107 To reach this construction, the trial court (and 
Federal Circuit) relied only upon the intrinsic evidence and almost exclusively upon the 
specification.108 Thus, in Multiform, the patent owner urged the ordinary dictionary 
definition of the disputed language; the *210 Federal Circuit refused it, and without 
relying on extrinsic evidence, selected a narrower construction based explicitly on the 
stated objectives of the invention. 
Next, consider O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co.109 In O.I. Corp., the disputed claim term 
was “passage” in a claim directed to a device for removing water vapor from a sample 
prior to analysis by gas chromatography.110 In the preferred embodiment of the invention, 
the passage (the interior of the tube) is threaded rather than smooth.111 The reason for the 
threading is to induce a swirling motion of the sample, which promotes removal of the 
water from the sample.112 
The Tekmar device fits this description, but the internal walls of the tube are 
smooth rather than threaded.113 Predictably, Tekmar argued that the term “passage” 
referred to a threaded (or similar configuration) but not to a smooth internal 
configuration.114 The patent owner, O.I. Corp. argued that the disputed term “passage” 
had its ordinary dictionary meaning.115 The trial court again rejected the dictionary 
                                                        
105 Id. at 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433. 
106 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433. 
107 Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1433. 
108 Mezdam highlighted a portion of the prosecution history favorable to its 
position, which was recited in the Federal Circuit’s opinion; this evidence was very weak. 
109 O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1777 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
110 Id. at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779. 
111 Id. at 1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780. 
112 Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780. 
113 Id. at 1582, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1781. 
114 Id. at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779. 
115 O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d at 1580, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779. 
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meaning and selected the narrower meaning urged by the accused infringer.116 To do that, 
it relied primarily upon a portion of the patent specification in which the inventors recited 
the advantages of the invention. As with the threaded or ridged configuration, the conical 
shape causes a swirling effect on the water vapor from the analyte slug. [I]n contrast, the 
prior art has generally specified that the pneumatic tubing and passageways between the 
trap and GC are smooth-walled.”117 Just like in Multiform, the O.I. Corp. panel, without 
relying on extrinsic evidence, rejected the broader dictionary definition and adopted a 
narrower subset of that meaning, based solely upon the portion of the specification that 
recites the purpose of the invention. 
Similarly in Mantech v. Hudson, the disputed claim term was “well” in a claim 
directed to monitoring the movement and levels of groundwater *211 contamination.118 
The patent owner, Mantech, argued that the term “well” had its ordinary dictionary 
meaning (modified slightly for this context), which was “a device that provides access to 
groundwater.”119 Neither parties’ expert disputed this general meaning of the term.120 
Hudson argued that as the term was used in the context of the patent, it referred to a 
structure that enabled either monitoring the groundwater or injecting substances into the 
groundwater.121 The Federal Circuit accepted this construction.122 As in Multiform and 
O.I. Corp., the Mantech panel rejected the dictionary definition and adopted a 
construction subsumed within, but not inconsistent with, that broader meaning. It 
developed that construction by a careful examination of the patent specification to 
determine the invention’s purpose. 
In addition to the three cases discussed in this section, many more cases in which 
the Federal Circuit has applied the Multiform model after Markman are described in 
pertinent part in Table B. One should also be aware that though each case that I discuss in 
this section was decided after Markman, the Multiform model has an established 
pedigree. Numerous panels have relied upon this Model to decide pre-Markman 
                                                        
116 Id. at 1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1779. 
117 Id., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1780-81. 
118 Mantech Environmental Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 
47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1732 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
119 Id. at 1370, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734. 
120 Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734. 
121 Id. at 1372, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1734. 
122 Id. at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738. 
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disputes.123 
*212 Again, one remarkable feature of the Multiform model cases is that they are 
decided without extrinsic evidence. In each of these cases, the patent owner argued that 
the disputed term’s meaning was coextensive with its ordinary or technical dictionary 
definition. The accused infringer argued that it was narrower--not repugnant to or outside 
of that definition--but subsumed within it. The significance of this is that the term’s 
general meaning to the PHOSITA--i.e., its “fixed meaning”--was not in dispute. The 
debate was conducted entirely within a single, agreed-upon lexical plane. What was in 
dispute was how the term was used in the text. The key distinction here is between intra- 
and extra-textual conflicts. So Multiform, and cases like it, stand for the proposition that 
arguments that narrowly focus upon how a term is used in a patent are best resolved by 
an examination of the patent itself. 
If the Multiform model is an emerging trend in Federal Circuit claim construction 
jurisprudence, then there should be reasons for it, and indeed there are: First, the 
                                                        
123 See, e.g., Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (construing the term “straw shaped” whether it requires 
hollowness or not: “Although the documentation does not expressly identify the 
hollowness characteristic as contributing to the inventive concept, it is not inconsistent 
with that concept either. Moreover, a significant and possibly critical contribution for this 
feature can be readily inferred: it permits the release of steam before the elements are 
burned away ....”); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Systems, Inc., 15 F.3d 
1573, 1578, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (construing the term “spaced 
apart” whether it requires that the surfaces be spaced apart over their entire surface area: 
“Were the claimed invention to have intersecting beam surfaces, in those areas where the 
beams intersected the invention would be unable to achieve its stated objectives of 
distinguishing valid inputs from stray inputs caused by small foreign objects or 
determining the velocity of an object approaching the touch panel.”); The Read Corp. v. 
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 823, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1426, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (construing 
the term “closed to the ground” on whether the object must actually touch the ground: 
“The prosecution history describes the short end’s function of acting as a barrier .... 
[T]hus the specification indicates an “end closed to the ground” means sufficiently closed 
to achieve those functions.”); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 987, 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1601, 1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (construing the term “plasticizer” whether it 
refers to just external or both internal and external plasticizers: “Nowhere does the 
specification of the ‘487 patent teach that external plasticizers must be used. On the 
contrary, some internally plasticized polymers are expressly disclosed in the 
specification. The emphasis is on the suitability of any plasticizer that will achieve the 
specified properties, not on the particular class of plasticizer.”); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. 
Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450, 230 U.S.P.Q. 416, 421 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (construing the term ‘smooth,’ “[w]e hold that smooth means smooth enough to 
serve the inventor’s purposes, i.e., not to inflame or irritate the eyelid of the wearer or be 
perceived by him at all when in place.”). 
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Multiform model may reflect the Federal Circuit’s growing impatience with poor claim 
drafting--either deliberate or inadvertent-- as well as with patent owners who during 
litigation, urge for constructions that are far broader than either the inventor or draftsman 
ever dreamed possible. This view is evidenced in more than a few recent Federal Circuit 
decisions. For instance, consider these remarks from Judge Clevenger in Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.: 
Here, too, we have expended significant effort endeavoring to ascertain the proper 
construction of the term “pusher assembly” in claim 24. As has already been noted, the 
‘519 specification provides minimal guidance on this question. Similarly, as U.S. 
Surgical points out, the Tompkins’ specification which originated the term is of little, if 
any, help. Without more explicit alternatives, we have been forced to spend a significant 
quantity of time carefully sifting through each piece of the reissue prosecution history 
made part of *213 the appellate record in an effort to discover the term’s proper 
meaning.124 
Similarly, Judge Nichols has also expressed the Federal Circuit’s obvious sense of 
frustration: “We are up against what we must realistically consider a growing inability of 
speakers and writers, lawyers, technicians, and laymen, to say what they intend to say 
with accuracy and clarity.”125 
Second, the Multiform model appears to be a deliberate, coherent strategy to 
adhere to Markman’s primary mandate. Again, a defining characteristic of the Multiform 
model cases is that they are resolved without extrinsic evidence even though both 
proffered constructions are plausible; they are genuinely close cases. Markman also 
insists that the trial court’s construction preserve the text’s internal coherence. Clearly, 
the Multiform model executes both of those directives. These cases produce claim 
constructions without extrinsic evidence, and do so by eliminating proffered 
constructions that are inconsistent with the purpose or stated objectives of the invention. 
A third possible reason for the emergence of the Multiform model is compromise. 
The interpretive strategy distilled from the Multiform model cases appears to be a 
compromise strategy between the two competing factions within the Federal Circuit 
                                                        
124 Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 
1581, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1019, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
125 ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1583, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Nichols, J., dissenting). 
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strategy for resolving difficult cases.126 In September of 1995, the *214 Federal Circuit 
                                                        
126 The post-Markman Court does not always rely upon the Multiform model--
even in those instances when it is applicable--in fact, on two occasions it has rejected it 
outright. See, York Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor, 99 F.3d 1568, 1573, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the phrase “a substantial part of the entire height 
thereof” [in a claim directed to a protective liner for a pickup truck bed] to determine to 
how much of the height the ridge members must extend; the plaintiff urged that the term 
means only “[a]mple extension to accomplish the purposes of locking loads.” Judge 
Rader, writing for the majority, rejected this interpretation: “The language and syntax of 
the claim preclude a functional definition of ‘substantial part.”’ Later he said: “This 
redraft [urged by the plaintiff] would essentially strip many words in the claim of their 
meaning.”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1579, 38 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1126, 1129-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term “dimension,” which 
either referred to linear measure [i.e., the resin beads shrunk by no more than 50% of 
their size based on diameter] or volume [the resin beads shrunk by no more than 50% of 
their size based on volume]. That the disputed term referred to volume was supported by 
reference to the objectives of the invention specification. For example, according to 
Hoechst’s expert: “[I]t is clearly the objective of this patent to distinguish between a resin 
that works because it has a porosity independent of swelling ... and another type of resin 
that depends upon swelling.” Judge Newman, writing for the majority, rejected this 
construction, primarily on the ground that if the functional definition were selected, then 
the major independent claim would exclude the preferred embodiment. The canon that 
interpretations that place the preferred embodiment outside the scope of the claim are to 
be avoided, is perhaps the strongest canon in patent law.); See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (An 
interpretation of a patent’s claims that would exclude from their scope “a preferred [and 
indeed only] embodiment ... is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive 
evidentiary support ....”); See also, e.g., Hoechst Celanese, 78 F.3d at 158, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1126, 1130 (“[I]t is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention in a way that 
excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would read the 
specification in such a way.”); I am aware of only one case in which this canon has been 
violated: Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In both York Products and Hoechst, the plaintiff’s proffered 
construction was rejected as in the Multiform model cases. Moreover, in York Products, 
the plaintiff’s interpretation would have read words out of the claim, while in Hoechst, 
the plaintiff’s construction would have violated the strong canon discussed above. Finally 
in J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co., the majority adopted a construction of 
the term “plastic flow temperature above 120°” in an invention directed to a vermin trap 
comprised of a flat surface coated with a pressure-sensitive adhesive. The disputed 
focused upon how parameter referred to in the claim term was measured. The majority 
(Judges Clevenger and Rich) concluded that a plastic flow temperature above 120° meant 
that the adhesive on the sheet must resist flow when exposed for 24 hours at a 
temperature of 120° and when the sheet is suspended in both horizontal and vertical 
(upside down) orientations. Judge Rader disagreed (i.e., his dissent actually applied the 
Multiform model). Thus, he relied upon portions of the intrinsic record showing that the 
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decided Markman, en banc. Of the twelve sitting judges, eight joined the majority 
opinion (written by then-Chief Judge Archer, who also authored the majority opinion in 
Cybor). Judges Mayer and Rader each filed concurring opinions; and Judge Newman 
filed a 27-page dissent. Markman did not provide a uniform standard for claim 
construction, so the Federal Circuit less than three years later decided to hear the matter 
again en banc, this time in Cybor v. FAS Technologies. Cybor did little to assure the 
patent bar that the Federal Circuit would apply a consistent claim construction standard 
from one panel to the next, as *215 evidenced by the voting alignment in Cybor.127 Of the 
12 judges who heard the case, five judges either wrote separately or joined a concurring 
opinion.128 
Subsequently, two disparate factions have emerged with respect to appellate 
deference to extrinsic evidentiary findings made at the trial level: Judges Mayer, 
Newman, Rader, Plager, and Bryson in one group; and Judges Rich, Gajarsa, Michel, 
Lourie, Clevenger, Shall, and Archer in the other.129 Notice the authorship of the twelve 
Multiform model cases recited in Table A. Six of the majority opinions were written by 
judges from one faction, and six from the other. 
So will the Markman model work in every case? No. That the Markman model is 
not applicable in some instances is not, however, a fair argument against its use. Besides, 
the Multiform model is a second filter in the event that the Markman model is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
invention was directed to solving the problem of conventional traps whose adhesive 
melted (hence flowed) during shipping. The inventors learned that the maximum ambient 
temperature encountered during shipping was 120°; this temperature was typically 
maintained for about 16 hours (at most), which corresponded to a normal day minus eight 
non-daylight hours (hence cooler temperatures). Hence, Judge Rader argued, 16 not 24 
hours was a far more relevant index to measure resistance to flow at 120°, since at this 
temperature an embodiment of the invention (or an accused device) would perform the 
stated objectives or purpose of the invention. 106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1641. 
127 To be fair, Markman and Cybor are directed at slightly different issues, though 
with substantial overlap. In Markman, the primary issue was whether claim construction 
was a judge or jury question. In Cybor, the issue was the proper standard of review in 
claim construction disputes, or more precisely, the proper degree of deference owned to 
the trial court’s factual findings (extrinsic evidence) in the context of a claim construction 
disputed. Hence though this issue was decided in Markman--i.e., Markman decreed a de 
novo standard of review for claim construction disputes--it was not actually the center of 
the dispute, as it was in Cybor. 
128 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1169 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
129 Judge Archer took senior status between the time that Markman and Cybor 
were decided en banc. Nevertheless, the Author has included him here, because he was 
the author of both majority en banc opinions. 
 
Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191 
 
inapplicable. Indeed, the Federal Circuit frankly acknowledging that not every claim 
construction dispute is the same, and then applying the correct precedent (interpretive 
strategy) to resolve the dispute, would go a long way towards achieving the stability in 
this area of law. The Federal Circuit, the patent bar, and its clients, so desperately need 
this stability. 
IV. Distinguishing Legal from Interpretive Matters 
The Multiform model cases are more difficult to resolve than Markman model 
cases. Are there cases in which neither model is applicable? Is extrinsic evidence 
necessary to resolve those disputes? 
*216 First, consider Athletic Alternatives Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc..130 In this 
dispute, the patent at issue was directed to a novel tennis racket, or more precisely to the 
tennis racket’s arrangement of strings on the racket face.131 In an ordinary string pattern, 
the string holes all lie along a single plane all the way around the racket face. The patent 
owner AAI discovered that if the strings are “splayed”--i.e., if the string holes are 
arranged alternatively above and below a central plane--then the racket’s user can impart 
greater spin on the ball.132 One key parameter in this regard is the “offset distance” or the 
distance between a string hole and a central plane.133 Also important is the number of 
offset distances, which is the number of different distances that the offset holes varied 
from the central plane.134 Defendant Prince’s racket had only two offset distances.135 The 
claim-in-suit required that the offset distance “varies between” minimum and maximum 
values.136 Prince argued that this referred to at least three offset distances (i.e., baseline 
value, minimum, and maximum).137 According to the patent owner, AAI, this language 
                                                        
130 Athletic Alternatives Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
131 Id. at 1576, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369. 
132 To visualize this plane, imagine cutting a tennis racket lengthwise into two 
identical halves, so that two mirror-image pieces result. A prior art tennis racket has all of 
its string holes lying along that axis; the AAI racket has some holes that lie above that 
axis, and some below it. 
133 Athletic Alternatives Inc., 73 F.3d at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1367. 
134 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369. 
135 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369. 
136 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369. 
137 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370. 
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covered two offset distances as well as three or more.138 
The claims themselves provided no clues. The specification was also silent with 
respect to whether only two offset distances yields an operable embodiment of the 
invention, or whether it is included within the scope of the claims.139 The prosecution 
history was a confusing mass of contradictory and irreconcilable remarks.140 This dispute 
was truly in equipoise, which the Federal Circuit frankly conceded: “[T]he dispositive 
claim language on its face is susceptible to two *217 equally plausible meanings ....”141 
What the Court did next was interesting. Judge Michel, writing for the majority, invoked 
section 112, paragraph 2 of the Patent Code, which states that the “[s]pecification shall 
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. 
Although statutory requirements of validity are routinely invoked as interpretive 
tools, section 112, paragraph 2 had not been invoked to solve claim construction 
problems, prior to AAI.142 From § 112, ¶ 2, Judge Michel extracted a notice requirement: 
Were we to allow AAI successfully to assert the broader of the two senses of 
“between” against Prince, we would undermine the fair notice function of the 
requirement that the patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent 
from which he can exclude others temporarily. Where there is an equal choice between 
a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that 
indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, 
we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower 
                                                        
138 Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372. 
139 Id., 73 F.3d at 1579, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371. 
140 Id. at 1580, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371. 
141 Id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370. 
142 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564, 
31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An appropriate method for resolving [a 
claim construction dispute] is to avoid those definitions upon which the PTO could not 
reasonably have relied when it issued the patent.”); Harris Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 114 F.3d 
1149, 1153, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1018, 1021 (“[C]laims should be read in a way that avoids 
ensnaring prior art if it is possible to do so.”); Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1065, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(citing ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 
U.S.P.Q. 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“Ambiguous claims, whenever possible, should be 
construed so as to preserve their validity.”); but see, Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, 
Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“It would not be 
appropriate for us now to interpret the claim differently just to cure a drafting error ....”). 
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meaning.143 
*218 AAI nicely illustrates the distinction between finding meaning and 
determining claim scope. The latter is a purely legal exercise, which asks not what the 
term means, but what the patent owner is entitled to claim. AAI also demonstrates that 
many claim construction disputes are not soluble on linguistic grounds. Often the 
disputed claim term will credibly support both proffered constructions, as we have seen 
in the Multiform model cases. However in AAI--unlike the Multiform model cases--both 
proffered constructions were consonant with the invention’s purpose. A statutory 
requirement of patentability was invoked to place principled constraints upon the possible 
spectrum of meaning. Like the Multiform model, this approach undoubtedly evolved in 
response to Markman. It is directed to panels to identify and apply disciplined 
interpretive techniques to resolve difficult claim construction disputes without the use of 
extrinsic evidence and that preserve the internal coherence of the text. 
In fact, AAI appears to be the seed of an emerging trend as evidenced by the fact 
that it has been closely followed in three recent Federal Circuit decisions. In addition, the 
AAI approach has been applied by judges on both sides of the Markman/Cybor debate. 
Likewise in Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. the Federal Circuit refused 
to extend the scope of meaning of the disputed claim term, reasoning that “[t]o the extent 
that the claim is ambiguous, a narrower reading which excludes the ambiguously covered 
subject matter must be adopted.”144 
 
                                                        
143 See AAI at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372 (Judge Michel said in the same 
opinion “[t]he primary purpose of the requirement [section 112, paragraph 2] is ‘to guard 
against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from 
uncertainty as to their respective rights.”’) (citing, General Electric Co. v. Wabash 
Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 37 U.S.P.Q.466 (1938)); see also, McClain v. 
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in requiring the 
patentee [to distinctly claim his invention] is not only to secure to him all to which he is 
entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.”); Rengo Co. v. Molins 
Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551, 211 U.S.P.Q. 303, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1891) (other citations 
omitted). 
144 See Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1581, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1019, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing AAI, F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1372); See also, Genentech Inc. v. The Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564-
65, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (this is a pre-Markman case similar to AAI 
and Ethicon: “[W]e are unwilling to say that the specification satisfies the enablement 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1 (1988) with respect to these broader definitions, or 
that the PTO could have relied on these definitions in issuing the patent.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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More recently, AAI was closely followed in Digital Biometrics.145 There, the 
disputed claim term was “array” in a claim directed to a system of generating a 
computerized image of a human fingerprint.146 The accused infringer’s system was 
virtually identical to Digital Biometrics’ except that the former system relied upon an 
array that did not store data in a digital format or in the memory.147 Naturally *219 this 
difference formed the basis for the claim construction dispute. Though Digital 
Biometrics’ preferred embodiments showed an array storing the data in memory and in 
digital format, it nevertheless argued that since the term “array” was not expressly 
defined anywhere in the patent specification, its “ordinary” meaning was controlling.148 
They proffered a meaning straight from the standard technical dictionary in the field.149 
This definition was sufficiently broad to cover data not stored in digital format or in 
memory. 
The panel rejected this argument.150 What is interesting is how Judge Plager, 
writing for the majority, justified the result. First, he found support for Identix’ (the 
accused infringer’s) narrower interpretation in the specification--though this is of 
questionable relevance since Digital Biometrics could have relied upon the venerable 
canon that preferred embodiments do not define the scope of the invention--by holding 
that limitations in the specification should not be imported into the claims.151 This 
provided the basis for ultimately rejecting Digital Biometrics’ broader construction in 
favor of the narrower one, reasoning that, between the two, the narrower one more 
adequately complied with section 112, paragraph 1. Granted, this argument is always 
available in favor of the narrower construction; nevertheless, Judge Plager took the 
unusual (and very sophisticated) step of illustrating the questionable validity (on section 
112, paragraph 1 grounds) of Digital Biometrics’ interpretation. By constructing a 
hypothetical claim based on that interpretation and analyzing the validity of that claim on 
section 112, paragraph 1 grounds, the Court found: 
 
                                                        
145 Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1418 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
146 Id. at 1343, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1424. 
147 Id. at 1342, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1423. 
148 Id. at 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426. 
149 Id., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426. 
150 Id. at 1348, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1426. 
151 See, e.g., Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 231 
U.S.P.Q. 185 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 
Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 191 
 
In view of the uncertainties surrounding the implementation of such an invention 
[described the hypothetical claim based on the patent’s owner’s proffered construction], 
we adopt the narrow claim construction that is clearly supported by the written 
description, and interpret “array” in claim 16 to mean a data structure stored in memory 
that is representative of a two-dimensional image.152 
*220 The AAI model was recently extended in Brand Management.153 There, the 
disputed claim term was “sides” in a claim directed to a construction device for 
connecting building elements (e.g., 2x2 planks) used to build decks.154 Plaintiff Brand 
Management argued that “sides” referred to just the internal sides; the accused infringer 
argued that it referred to both internal and external sides.155 The Brand Management 
panel selected the narrower of the two proffered constructions once again, closely 
following the AAI decision: The term “sides” is ambiguous to the extent that it could be 
interpreted to refer to either internal sides or both internal and external sides. [F]aced 
with two competing interpretations that are equally tenable, we choose to reinforce the 
notice requirement by construing claim 1 narrowly.156 
The AAI family of cases compels the question whether the Federal Circuit intends 
for trial courts to apply this model before or after it allows extrinsic evidence. In other 
words, must the trial court invoke the AAI model immediately after exhausting the 
intrinsic record? Or is it first permitted to admit extrinsic evidence? If that provides no 
solution, then can the Court invoke the AAI technique? The answer to this question is 
important because the AAI model is applicable in every single claim construction dispute. 
In AAI itself, the court mentioned that no extrinsic evidence was available. Similarly, the 
authority following AAI did not provide an answer. For instance, from the Digital 
Biometrics panel: 
[I]f after consideration of the intrinsic evidence there remains doubt as to the exact 
meaning of the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to 
determine the proper construction. If a claim falls into this latter category, however, 
another claim construction canon comes into play. Because the applicant has the burden 
to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (1994), if the claim is susceptible to a 
broader and a narrower meaning, and the narrower one is clearly supported by the 
intrinsic evidence while the broader one *221 raises questions of enablement under § 
                                                        
152 Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1346, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing AAI, 73 F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372). 
153 Brand Management, Inc. v. Sutherland Lumber Southwest Inc., 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15255 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
154 Id. at *5. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at *8 (quoting AAI, 73 F.3d at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372). 
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112, ¶ 1, we will adopt the narrower of the two.157 
Whether a trial court can allow extrinsic evidence prior to invoking the AAI model 
deserves resolution by the Federal Circuit. 
If extrinsic evidence was ever justified to resolve a claim construction dispute, 
then AAI, Digital Biometrics, and Brand Management are striking exemplars.158 It is hard 
to imagine three cases in which the meaning of the disputed claim term was more in 
equipoise, and yet the Federal Circuit still did not rely on extrinsic evidence to resolve 
them. 
If Digital Biometrics and Brand Management are reliable indicators, then the 
interpretive strategy decreed in AAI has become securely embedded in the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence.159 Indeed, unlike the Markman and Multiform 
models, the AAI line of authority can be invoked to solve any claim construction dispute. 
Therefore, the principle established in AAI must be cautiously applied. The purpose of the 
discussion that follows is to suggest the limits of this principle. 
Contrast AAI with Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.160 There, the disputed 
claim term was “plasticizer,” a term of art in polymer chemistry.161 Plasticizers come in 
two types: internal and external.162 Neither the term “internal” nor “external” is used in 
the patent specification.163 The patent discloses species of plasticizers that are all external 
plasticizers (but without using the term “external”) as the preferred embodiments.164 
Several species of internal plasticizers are obliquely mentioned, though not 
emphasized.165 The patent owner *222 argued that “plasticizer” referred to both internal 
                                                        
157 Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
158 Collected in Table C. 
159 The Author is aware of only one case in which the Federal Circuit has cited 
and refused to apply the AAI approach: Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting, 
Inc., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21294 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
160 Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1601 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
161 Id. at 986, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
162 Id. at 985, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1603. 
163 Id. at 987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
164 Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
165 Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
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and external plasticizers.166 The accused infringer urged that the term referred to only 
external plasticizers.167 If Specialty Composites followed AAI, then it would have invoked 
section 112, paragraph 2 and reasoned that the inventor did not adequately disclosed both 
types of plasticizers, and therefore the term shall be construed to satisfy section 112, 
paragraph 2’s implicit notice requirement. Yet the Specialty Composites panel decided 
the case the other way.168 Hence, despite the limited disclosure, the claim term 
“plasticizer” covers both internal and external plasticizers according to the Court.169 Are 
AAI and Specialty Composites reconcilable? 
Perhaps they are. The focus in AAI was upon the patent’s disclosure--i.e., was a 
racket having two splay patterns adequately disclosed in the specification? Again, the 
Court said no. Recall that one can satisfy section 112’s strictures in either of two ways: 1) 
through express disclosure in the specification; or 2) by relying upon the PHOSITA to 
furnish the teaching (i.e., under established Federal Circuit law, a patent specification 
incorporates by reference all that is well-known in the art to which the patent is directed, 
and so therefore the patent need not include that “background” information, and indeed 
preferably omits it).170 Therefore, an implicit indifference curve is at work: the closer the 
particular element is to the invention’s center of gravity, the greater the disclosure 
requirement. Put another way, if the particular claim element in dispute is a novel feature 
of the invention--i.e., if the invention, or part of it, resides in that element--then the 
PHOSITA will have no knowledge of it, since it is by definition “novel,” and therefore 
not a well-known principle in the art. Therefore, the inventor must disclose it in the 
patent specification with particularity. This is precisely the scenario in AAI. The splay 
pattern was the heart of the invention, offset string holes in a tennis racket was the 
invention. The PHOSITA could not be expected to know whether a racket having only 
two offset distances would result in a functional embodiment of the invention. More 
precisely, the PHOSITA was unable to furnish that knowledge (if he was, then the of 
course, invention would fail for lack of novelty). Therefore, since AAI’s specification did 
not furnish that teaching, then it was unavailable to the *223 PHOSITA.171 The narrower 
construction was selected to preserve the patent’s validity on the grounds of section 112, 
                                                        
166 Id. at 986, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
167 Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1604. 
168 Id. at 993, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1609. 
169 Id. at 988, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1606. 
170 See, e.g., Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 804 F.2d 
659, 231 U.S.P.Q. 649 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 
802 F.2d 1367, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also, In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 
661, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[U]nless the information is well known 
in the art, the application itself must contain this information ....”). 
171 That is, claims directed to those particular embodiments were not enabled. 
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paragraphs 1,2 grounds. 
Now contrast AAI with Specialty Composites where the invention was for foam 
rubber earplugs. The advantage of the invention lay in the earplugs’ compressibility, 
which allowed them to be squeezed between the thumb and forefinger and inserted into 
the ear canal, and their plasticity, which allowed them to return to original size so that 
they formed a reasonably tight seal around the ear canal (yet were easy to insert). In order 
to achieve the desired compressibility and plasticity, a “plasticizer” had to be added to the 
foam to permit it to be compressed, yet still have a sufficiently high rate of recovery to 
fill the ear canal. The Federal Circuit quite correctly believed that the choice of 
plasticizer type--internal or external--was of little consequence to the invention: 
The emphasis is on the suitability of any plasticizer that will achieve the specified 
properties, not on the particular class of plasticizer. [T]he specification states: “Any 
flexible polymeric material which can be foamed so as to result in an ultimately formed 
earplug structure meeting the recovery rate and pressure criteria set forth herein above 
constitutes a satisfactory material of construction in the earplug of the invention.172 
What is quite clear from this passage is that the panel did not believe that the type 
of plasticizer was a crucial aspect of the invention because the inventor said that it was 
not, which is credible since it is like an admission against interest. Therefore, if it was not 
a novel feature of the invention, but rather an ancillary feature of an overall device of 
which the invention was also a part, then the PHOSITA could be invoked to furnish the 
requisite knowledge to fully practice the invention (i.e. to choose between internal and 
external plasticizers). 
With these thoughts in mind, the patent owner in AAI was not permitted to rely 
upon generally known principles of the relevant art because such principles relating to the 
element in disputes did not exist (indeed if he purported to have invented them). On the 
other hand, the patent owner in Specialty Composites was allowed to rely upon the 
routine implicit teachings of the relevant art to complete the patent disclosure. In other 
words, the term “plasticizer” subsumes external and *224 internal plasticizers because the 
PHOSITA says it does and would know that either would yield an operable embodiment 
of the invention. 
The point of this section is only to illustrate the boundaries of the principles set 
forth in AAI. AAI should not be relied upon to narrow a claim term in those instances in 
which established principles of the relevant technical discipline are available to 
supplement the term’s meaning beyond the meaning supplied in the patent specification. 
These instances occur when the element in dispute is generally at the invention’s 
periphery, rather than at its hub, where the PHOSITA’s knowledge (in theory) falls to 
zero. 
 
                                                        
172 Specialty Composites, 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1601. 
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Conclusion 
Now the relationship between the three families of cases--the Markman model 
cases, the Multiform model cases, and the AAI model cases--is understood. In the 
Markman-type disputes, linguistic implausibility provides the solution. If both proffered 
constructions traverse this minimal hurdle, then it becomes irrelevant, and so a 
subsequent filter must be applied. In the Multiform model cases, the ordinary dictionary 
meaning is rejected in favor of a subset of that broader meaning, narrowed according to 
its use in the context of the patent, and on the ground that the narrower definition is more 
consistent with the stated objectives of the invention, or that the rejected interpretation is 
inconsistent with those objectives. Like the Markman model, the Multiform model 
generates its construction from the intrinsic record alone. In the AAI model cases, both 
proffered constructions are linguistically plausible, and both are roughly consistent with 
the purpose of the invention. Hence, between two equally plausible interpretations, the 
narrower one is selected by invoking a statutory ground of validity namely section 112. 
What the prior discussion should at least illustrate is that not all claim 
construction disputes are alike. Different types of disputes have created different lines of 
authority; this heterogeneity should be accounted for in deciding claim construction 
cases. Three distinct lines of authority are chiseled from the block of the Federal Circuit’s 
post-Markman precedent, which are now securely installed in the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretive repertoire. Indeed, step-wise application of these three successive filters, 
beginning with the Markman model to resolve the easiest cases first, and ending with the 
AAI model in the most difficult cases--which resist *225 solution by the Markman and 
Multiform models--actually defines the Federal Circuit’s claim construction approach in 
the post-Markman era.173 
 
                                                        
173 Application of this three-part algorithm to resolve claim construction disputes 
is a very good way for trial courts to avoid reversal. 
